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Abstract
This paper offers a model of how computer technology has changed the labor market, demonstrat-
ing that wage differentials between computer users and non-users are consistent with computers first
being introduced in high-wage jobs following cost efficiency. Furthermore, skill upgrading occurs
following a reemphasis on non-routine tasks after adoption. The model also reveals that neither
differences in computer skills nor complementary skills are needed to explain wage differentials
between users and non-users, skill upgrading, and the changing organization and intensity of work.
Finally, the predicted effects on the wage structure are consistent with empirical evidence.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: J30; J31; O33
Keywords: Wage differentials by skill; Computer use and skill
1. Introduction
The adoption of computer technology has substantially changed the workplace. Figures
from the October Supplements of the US Current Population Surveys show that computer
use at work has increased from 24.3 percent in 1984 to 52.5 percent in 1997. This use
is not evenly distributed among workers: in 1997, 74.9 percent of the college graduates
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used a computer, compared to 38.6 percent of the high-school graduates. In addition, in the
late 1980s computer users were 15–20 percent better paid than non-users (Krueger, 1993).
Furthermore, both firm-specific case studies (Levy and Murnane, 1996; Fernandez, 2001;
Autor et al., 2002) and economy-wide investigations (see Autor et al., 1998, and Katz and
Autor, 1999 for an overview) report a positive correlation between skill upgrading and the
use of computer technology.
The higher wages of computer users and skill upgrading suggest that computer technology
is a source of skill-biased technological change. The most common explanation is that
on-the-job computer use requires specific skills. Apparently these skills are particularly
present among higher educated workers, explaining differences in computer use between
relatively educated and uneducated workers and rising wage inequality between high-school
and college graduates. Apart from computer skills (Krueger), other studies emphasize the
importance of complementary skills (Levy and Murnane) leading to skill upgrading and
rising wage inequality. However, Bell (1996), using UK longitudinal data, argues that there
appears to be no relationship between computer skills and wages. Furthermore, DiNardo
and Pischke (1997) comparing US and German cross-sectional data, Doms et al. (1997)
combining US cross-sections and establishment data, and Entorf and Kramarz (1997) using
French longitudinal data conclude that the higher wages of computer users are likely to be
the result of signaling or unobserved heterogeneity between workers. In addition, Chennells
and Van Reenen (1997), Doms et al. (1997), Entorf and Kramarz (1997) and Entorf et al.
(1999) have shown that workers using computer technology were already better paid before
its introduction.2
This paper offers a model to explain the above empirical evidence in a unified way.
More insight into the impact of computers on the labor market could be gained by an ex-
perimental approach in which a computer is made available to a randomly drawn group
T of treated workers, while a control group U (untreated people) does not get one. An
advantage of this approach is that random assignment excludes selection effects. Be-
cause of the small scale of this experiment, market effects due to changes in product
prices and wages are negligible. The main problem of such an experiment is that it is
not clear what kind of computer facilities have to be used, because its usefulness de-
pends on the tasks to be performed, the configuration of the hardware and software, and
information available for use. Furthermore, settings between different jobs vary, and it
seems to be impossible to guarantee an acceptable experiment. In addition, the possibil-
ity of using a computer requires users to recognize its options, and the practice of com-
puter adoption being preceded by a detailed investigation of the workplace can seldom be
simulated.
As an alternative route we develop a theoretical approach and look within a firm and
consider two identical agents (T and U) who have identical jobs. Dealing with artificial
2 Chennells and Van Reenen, using UK establishment-based data, endogenize technology and find that the
wage-technology correlation is mainly driven by the impact of higher wages on computer adoption. Entorf and
Kramarz find that 1 year of experience with using computers adds about 1 percent to the wages of workers
using computers. Entorf et al., matching French workers and their firms, find that the wage effects of com-
puter use are highest after 2 or 3 years, the total returns being about 2 percent. Doms et al. argue that firms
using computers employ more higher educated workers and pay on average higher wages both prior to and after
adoption.
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agents rather than with real workers has a number of advantages. First, it enables us to
investigate the different effects of the introduction of the computer separately, ruling out
unobserved heterogeneity. Second, it enables us to compare the impact on two identical
workers in a situation where one gets a computer and the other does not. Third, it allows
for a comparison of the effects of computer use between two workers that differ only in one
specified aspect of their job (see also DiNardo and Pischke, 1996 for a discussion on such
experiments).
The results can be summarized as follows: First, wages are an important factor in ex-
plaining the introduction of computers because the relative costs for high-wage workers
to carry out a task are much higher than for low-wage workers accomplishing the same
task. Hence, a firm gains more by letting a high-wage worker carry out this task using a
computer. This result is consistent with the evidence that computer users earn higher wages
both prior to and after adoption. It also reveals that neither computer skills nor complemen-
tary skills are needed to explain wage differentials between computer users and non-users.
Second, the introduction of computers leads to skill upgrading because of a reemphasis on
the non-routine job activities at the expense of routine tasks. This result is consistent with
the findings of Autor et al. (1998) for within-industry skill upgrading and the estimation
results of Fernandez for within-firm skill upgrading after the adoption of computer tech-
nology. Thirdly, although adoption induces skill upgrading and affects wages, we show
that wage differentials are unlikely to increase further when computer use becomes more
common in lower skilled jobs. Finally, we derive implications for the firm-wide adoption
of computers, the way in which workers cooperate and increasing work intensity consistent
with the empirical evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model, Section 3 discusses
the effects of the diffusion of computers on the wage structure, and Section 4 presents some
extensions to the model to show effects of firm-wide adoption, the way people cooperate
and work together and work intensity. Section 5 concludes.
2. A model of computerization
2.1. Basic setting
We consider a market in which we investigate the decision making of one firm concerning
agents T and U, who are identical and produce the same product. In this market every firm
treats the wage (w) for every agent with any set of skills (s) as given. By the same token,
the price for the firm’s output p(q) is also given, given the specific characteristics (q) of the
product. A job consists of several tasks, and the production function of the firm describes
the time needed by each agent to perform these tasks. We assume that the skill level of the
agent and the product characteristics of the good produced determine the time requirements
d to carry out the tasks j(dj(s, q)). For convenience, we assume that a job consists of two
tasks. Given these ingredients, the firm chooses product characteristics, a division of tasks,
and an agent to maximize profits per unit of production:
max
s,q
p(q)− w(s)(d1(s, q)+ d2(s, q)). (1)
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From the perspective of the two agents, a similar optimization problem occurs in which s
has to be held constant:
max
q
p(q)− w(s)(d1(s, q)+ d2(s, q)). (2)
From the agents’ perspective the optimal allocation of time to produce one unit of output
leads to τj(s) units of time to complete task j. The total time needed to produce one unit of
output equals
τ(s) = τ1(s)+ τ2(s). (3)
For simplicity, assume that task 1 represents aspects of a job that can be computerized and
that task 2 includes activities that cannot be computerized. In addition, suppose that agent
T gets a computer to perform task 1 and that agent U continues to work without a com-
puter. This “experiment” implies that agent T has to operate a computer that assists him
in performing task 1. Optimization of the production function after computerization leads
to τˆ2(s) (the time needed for task 2) and τc(s) (the time needed to operate the computer).
The optimal allocation of time in the production function might change, since it requires
τc(s) to operate the computer instead of carrying out task 1 manually. τc depends on s be-
cause carrying out the computerized task requires skills and the time involved to operate the
computer might vary with s. Computerization might also impact the job aspects included
in task 2. If the good produced and the way it is produced remains unchanged, there is no
reason why the time required for task 2 should change. However, the complementarity or
substitutability between task 1 and task 2, represented by changes in the optimal product
characteristics q (which has now changed into a complementarity or substitutability be-
tween computer technology and particular human tasks) could be regarded as a channel for
changing configurations of jobs. Such a relationship arises once a firm uses the possibilities
of a computer to change the characteristics of the product, production process, the division
of time between the two tasks, or the organization of work. We, therefore, allow τ2 to change
as a result of computerization into τˆ2. In the case where τˆ2 < τ2 (τˆ2 > τ2), computer use by
agent T results into less (more) time required to perform task 2.3 Furthermore, this change
might depend on s, which could lead τˆ2(s) to stress different components of s than τ2(s).4
The time agent T needs to produce one unit of output now equals
τT (s) = τc(s)+ τˆ2(s) (4)
whereas the time needed by agent U to produce is still given by Eq. (3).
Define θj(s) = −(∂τj(s)/∂s)/(τj(s)) as the time for task j saved by a marginal increase
in s. We assume θj(s) ≥ 0 because s affects the time needed to perform this task and an
increase in s leads to a higher productivity. Now, task 1 is a routine task if the time saved
by s to perform this task is less than the time saved to perform task 2 (i.e., θ1(s) < θ2(s))
3 For convenience, we skip the argument s, except in cases where confusion may arise.
4 Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) derive that workers specialize in different tasks after computerization. In
addition, they perform more management tasks on their own. Autor et al. (2003) show that the work bundled into
the non-computerized task becomes more important. In a previous version of this paper, Borghans and Ter Weel
(2001) explicitly address the effects of changing product quality and optimal product quality when computers are
adopted.
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and a skilled task if the time saved by s to perform this task is more than the time saved
to perform task 2 (i.e., θ1(s) > θ2(s)). We assume that task 1 is a routine task because
computer technology generally takes over routine job activities.5
If a firm pays a wage w(s), the costs k per unit of output without a computer equal
knc = w(τ1 + τ2) (5)
and with a computer these costs equal
kc = (w+ c)(τc + τˆ2), (6)
where c reflects the costs of computer use.6 The total costs the employer has to incur
when agent T uses a computer are higher than the costs of not using one if c(τc + τˆ2) >
w((τ1 + τ2) − (τc + τˆ2)). This threshold to adopt a computer depends on wage costs
relative to computer costs and the time changes in production if the computer is adopted.
An assumption for this relationship to hold is that the costs of the computer are related
to the time needed to produce one unit of output. This assumption reflects an essential
characteristic of the way in which computers are currently used in the workplace, because
the part of the working time the computer is actually used depends mainly on the time the
employee needs to fulfil the computerized task.7
2.2. When are computers adopted?
The decision to adopt a computer is based on a break-even point at which the firm’s profits
are the same for agent T , who uses a computer, and agent U, who does not use a computer.
The break-even point or threshold b, at which c(τc+ τˆ2) = w((τ1+ τ2)− (τc+ τˆ2)), equals
b = w
(
τ1 + τ2
τc + τˆ2 − 1
)
. (7)
The break-even wage depends on the wage w and a function of the specific tasks and the
skills.8 If b > c, a computer is profitable because the actual costs of the computerization are
below the break-even costs. Allowing for some randomness in the costs of computer use, a
higher b yields a higher probability of computer use (i.e., P(computer)= P(b > c)). This
5 As a counter example in which task 1 is a skilled task, we might think of a chess player. IBM has shown that
thinking about algorithms for the next move can be successfully computerized, but at the same time it requires a
huge number of skills from the chess player. Yet, moving the chess pieces and intimidating the competitor (task
2) takes the real Garry Kasparov. However, these cases are rare to the extent that we may assume that for the labor
market as a whole the effects of cases in which task 1 is a routine task will prevail. See Borghans and Ter Weel
(2001) for a more elaborate discussion of this assumption.
6 These costs can be thought of as maintenance, depreciation and operating costs, but also as costs of new
software applications, hardware and technical assistance.
7 Implicitly we also assume that c has to be paid for the entire duration of the working time, which means that
there should be one computer for each employee. This implies that the computer stands idle when the worker is
performing task 2.
8 If the computer is only needed for some fraction of the job (λ), the expression for the break-even point becomes
b = [(w(τ1 + τ2))/(τc + λτˆ2)][1 − (τc + τˆ2)/(τ1 + τ2)]. The gain from using the computer only for some time
further increases the benefits of introducing a computer. The use of the computer in this case can be seen as a
situation in which more than one employee makes use of one single computer.
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model has a very simple (but strong) prediction: if b > c, the firm will adopt a computer,
and if b < c, the firm will not adopt.9
In Eq. (7), 1 − (τc + τˆ2)/(τ1 + τ2) represents the time gain of using a computer. This
term depends on the specific character of the tasks to be performed as well as on the agent’s
skill level. The time gain reflects the development of new and more efficient applications,
software and hardware. With respect to s we obtain that if agent T becomes more efficient
in performing both tasks 1 and 2 (i.e., τc and τˆ2 are relatively low compared to τ1 and τ2), he
benefits more from computer use than a less efficient worker. In this setting, the relationship
of (τc+ τˆ2)/(τ1+τ2)with s can be seen as the skill bias of the adoption of a new technology,
because agent T ’s skills might either be related to the performance of the computerized task
(τc) or to the other task (τˆ2). This might provide skilled workers with an advantage to use a
computer over unskilled workers. However, workers with high skills to carry out task 2 do
not have a higher probability to use computers if it leaves the ratio τ2/τˆ2 unaffected. Further-
more, even very large differences in computer skills might have only a very moderate impact
on computerization if the time needed for task 1 is low compared to the time needed for task 2.
Eq. (7) also reveals that the threshold to adopt a computer is lower (b is higher) when the
wage costs are higher. This result implies that, given a worker’s skill level, differences in
wages trigger computer adoption at different points in time for different wage levels, which
is consistent with the findings of Doms et al., who observe that firms paying higher wages
are more likely to adopt computers, and the findings of Chennells and Van Reenen, Entorf
and Kramarz, and Entorf et al. that high-wage workers have a higher probability of using
computer technology than low-wage workers. It is also consistent with the observation that
workers adopting computers earn higher wages than non-users prior to adoption but does
not address this to unobserved heterogeneity (DiNardo and Pischke, 1997, and Entorf and
Kramarz), computer skills (Krueger) or other skill advantages of higher educated workers
(Levy and Murnane). Furthermore, the results are consistent with the finding of a relatively
low net productivity effect from computer use because it depends on the relative time gain in
production and the inclusion of the costs of adopting a computer into the model (Entorf and
Kramarz). Finally, this finding is consistent with the arguments put forward by Bresnahan
(1999) that not only skilled jobs are well-suited to computer use but that also jobs at the
lower spectrum of the labor market include tasks which can be computerized. The fact that
these jobs have not been computerized yet could be explained by the fact that the wages
of the workers occupying those jobs are currently not high enough to merit a profitable
adoption of computer technology.
2.3. Skill upgrading
Skill requirements are the result of the firm’s profit maximization. Since a change in
the skill requirements affects the productivity in both tasks, changes in the required skills
9 This way of modelling technology adoption is consistent with the approaches of David (1969) and Davies
(1979) who also argue that the costs of new technologies are important determinants of its adoption and diffusion.
Other approaches predicting the adoption and diffusion of general purpose technologies are also consistent with
our model because computer use is pervasive in a wide range of sectors in ways that change their modes of
production (e.g., Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)).
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before computerization were not profitable for skill s if
∂
∂s
= ∂(p(q)− w(s)(d1(s, q)+ d2(s, q)))
∂s
= 0. (8)
The reason for this is that if a firm hires a more-skilled worker in a particular job, its
productivity (1/(τ1 + τ2)) increases but its wage costs (w) also increase. This tradeoff
between higher skills and higher wages gives the firm’s optimal skill choice:
∂w(s)/∂s
w
= τ1
τ1 + τ2 θ
1 + τ2
τ1 + τ2 θ
2. (9)
After agent T has adopted a computer this changes into
∂w(s)/∂s
w
= τc
τc + τˆ2 θ
c + τˆ2
τc + τˆ2 θˆ
2. (10)
To equilibrate the equation, the firm changes its skill demand after computerization. Eq. (10)
reveals three factors determining the optimal skill level: (i) an increase in the marginal wage
costs of skills ((∂w/∂s)/w) leads to a decrease in demanded skill requirements;10 (ii) an
increase in the advantage of skill i in performing task j (an increase in θc and/or θˆ2 compared
to θ1 and θ2) leads to an increase in demanded skill requirements; and (iii) a change in the
relative weights of the two tasks in the production process (τc/(τc + τˆ2) and τˆ2/(τc + τˆ2))
leads to an increase (decrease) in skill demand in the case of a shift towards a skilled
(routine) task.11
Keeping the wage structure constant, the condition in Eq. (10) changes in three different
ways after computerization. First, if task 1 becomes a more skilled task, the firm demands
a higher skilled worker because of the importance of the skills to operate the computer
effectively. Second, the performance of task 2 might demand a more skilled worker because
skilled workers gain more time than unskilled workers after the introduction of the computer.
Finally, even if the influence of s on both tasks is kept constant, the weight attached to both
tasks might change upon the introduction of the computer. In other words, if task 1 is a routine
task, skill requirements increase because the computer puts more weight on the performance
of task 2. An implication of this latter result is that for all jobs in which the computerized
task is a routine task, the introduction of a computer increases skill requirements, even if
the effect of skills on both tasks separately is kept constant.
This latter finding provides a novel insight because it implies that even if working with
a computer fails to increase the comparative advantage of skilled workers in each task as
such, skill requirements might nevertheless be raised. The particular skills that become more
10 This can be seen from the second-order condition. Since Eq. (10) reflects a maximum, the second-order
condition for skill s is equal to [∂((τc/(τc+ τˆ2))θc+ (τˆ2/(τc+ τˆ2))θˆ2)]/[∂s] < [∂(∂w(s)/∂s]/w)/[∂s]. This means
that if s becomes more expensive, employers will diminish their skill demands.
11 Because the relationship between skill and productivity generally differs between both tasks, each task would
have different skill requirements if carried out by separate workers. Skill requirements for the routine task would
be lower than skill requirements for the skilled task. Since we assume that both tasks cannot be separated, this
implies that the actual skill level is a compromise between the skill levels that are optimal for these tasks separately.
The skill level resulting from this compromise depends on the time needed for each task. A change in the relative
time required for each task affects the weighting of these effects and therefore influences the recruitment decision.
See Section 4.2 for a discussion in terms of the model.
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important are not necessarily related to operating a computer or to certain tasks that increase
productivity due to the adoption of a computer, but might be skills already used before
computerization. This observation also offers an explanation for the difficulties encountered
in the search for a direct link between technological change and increased demand for
particular skills because it is likely that each job that becomes subject to computerization
includes other skills that become emphasized in the performance of non-computerized job
activities. This results is also consistent with the findings of Levy and Murnane (1996),
Fernandez (2001) and Autor et al. (2002) that the time needed to perform non-routine
activities rises relative to routine activities after adoption. It is also consistent with upgrading
taking place within computer intensive sectors (Autor et al., 1998).
3. The diffusion of computers
To explain whether the adoption of computers and the observed skill upgrading are
the result of a bias in the embodiment skills or whether wage costs are likely to ex-
plain computer use, we address the effects of the diffusion of computers according to both
arguments.
Let us start by analyzing the skill argument. According to Eq. (7), differences in the
probability of computer use can be explained by differences in (τc + τˆ2)/(τ1 + τ2). If so,
this factor is decreasing in skills as shown in the top panel of Fig. 1. If c→ 0, the adoption
of a computer is beneficial starting from a skill level of x (i.e., when (τc + τˆ2)/(τ1 +
τ2) = 1). Since the unit of measurement is one expressed in time units, c is divided by
the wage to be comparable in different situations. In addition, we assume that computer
costs are proportional to the productivity of a worker and add a constant factor to the
productivity line to represent total costs. The figure shows that when computer costs are
high, the break-even decision is at point z. With a relatively low c, this break-even point is at
point y.
The bottom panel of Fig. 1 shows changes in profits for the firm per unit of time worked
when c is either relatively high or low. This panel shows that the firm’s profits are increasing
in the skill level of its workforce. It also shows that if c drops, the introduction of computers
among lower skilled workers further increases the wages of higher skilled workers because
their skills become increasingly scarce.
These patterns are different if computer adoption is explained by the level of wages rel-
ative to computer costs. In this case the productivity gain for computer use is constant in
terms of time units. Since c is equal per unit of time, it is decreasing in wages, explaining
computer use restricted to wages of at least z if computer costs are high and at least y if
they are low as in Fig. 2. There are two differences compared to the situation in Fig. 1.
First, there is no longer a saturation point x beyond which workers will never use a com-
puter, even if c→ 0. Secondly, the bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows that the profits of using a
computer converge to a constant rate and that the major increases in profits are for the new
computer users. For workers already using a computer, the profits reach a maximum at the
point at which computer costs are negligible compared to wages. Within the group of com-
puter users, changes in relative wage differentials are comparatively small and disappear if
c = 0.
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Fig. 1. If skills determine computer technology adoption, the profits of using a computer are increasing in skill
and induce ever increasing wage inequality.
Fig. 2 tells the most likely story. First, Entorf et al. have estimated the returns to computer
use to peak after 2 or 3 years of computer use, the total returns being around 2 percent.
This is consistent with the wage effects drawn in Fig. 2, but inconsistent with the ever
increasing wages of skilled computer users in Fig. 1. Second, many relatively unskilled
workers currently use computers and do not seem to experience problems in using computers
because the technology is becoming more user friendly and is adapting to specific needs (e.g.,
Borghans and Ter Weel, 2004 for an empirical assessment). Also older workers reach similar
productivity effects from using computers (e.g., Borghans and Ter Weel, 2002; Weinberg,
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Fig. 2. If wages determine computer technology adoption, all workers gain from computer use and wage inequality
levels off if everybody has adopted.
2002; Friedberg, 2003). Third, wage inequality between computer users and non-users is
not increasing at an increasing pace in recent periods, which would be necessary for the
story in Fig. 1 to hold. Finally, computers are a general purpose technology. In our model
a general purpose technology is a technology for which the ratio (τc + τˆ2)/(τ1 + τ2) is
of similar size (and larger than 1) in all occupations. In that case wage costs relative to
computer costs are the main determinant of computer use explaining high-wage workers
using computers first and more often by the fact that the benefits outweigh the costs. If the
costs fall, low-wage workers also adopt computers.
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4. Extensions
4.1. Firm effects
We assumed that firms decide upon computer technology investments for each worker
separately. In practice it seems to be impossible to introduce computers at the workplace
of the firm’s high-wage workers, leaving low-wage workers unaffected. Our model can be
extended to deal with the firm’s decision upon adopting computer technology for its entire
workforce. To do so, the additional profits from computerization changes into(∑
i
wi + cNf(N)
)(∑
i
τc +
∑
i
τˆ2
)
−
∑
i
wi
(∑
i
τ1 +
∑
i
τ2
)
. (11)
In this equation total wage costs rather than individual wage costs matter, total time spent on
both tasks matters and computer costs per worker become lower if the number of employees
increases. The function f describes the ratio between the actual costs per worker and the
costs per worker in a one-worker firm. Hence, f(1) = 1, and since the costs per worker
decrease in N, f ′(N) < 0. In a similar fashion, the break-even costs b for computer use per
worker now equal
b = 1
f(N)
(1/N)
∑
i w
(∑
i τ1 +
∑
i τ2
)+ q∑
i τc +
∑
i τˆ2
(
1−
∑
i τc +
∑
i τˆ2∑
i τ1 +
∑
i τ2
)
. (12)
Three properties of the break-even decision have changed compared to Eq. (7). First, the
break-even point depends on the level of average wages in the firm rather than on the level
of an individual’s wage, which is consistent with the evidence from Doms et al. that firms
paying on average higher wages have a higher probability to adopt computers. Second,
the break-even point depends on the average time spent on a task rather than individual
time, so workers who spend only a relatively small amount of time on task 1 might also
get a computer (e.g., CEOs and managers). Third, the break-even point is increasing in
firm size N. Hence, larger firms more easily introduce computers than smaller firms, which
is consistent with the evidence presented by Barras (1990) for the financial and business
service sectors.
4.2. Working together and organizational change
Computers also affect the way in which workers cooperate and work together. Consider
a situation that task 1 is carried out by an unskilled worker, while task 2 is carried out by a
skilled worker. This is efficient if the time needed to instruct the unskilled worker to perform
task 1 is recovered by the lower wage costs needed to carry out task 1:
τ1 − τinstruct
τunskilled1
>
wunskilled
w
. (13)
Splitting the two tasks into different jobs is profitable if (i) the wage differential between
both workers is large, (ii) instruction time is short, (iii) unskilled workers are relatively good
at performing task 1, and (iv) task 1 is a relatively time consuming task.
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The introduction of a computer changes the time requirements. If τskilledc < τunskilledc it
might be beneficial to undo the separation of tasks into two distinct jobs. However, if there
is no skill bias in performing task 1, the fact that the time needed to operate a computer falls
might lead to an integration of both tasks again. Computerization might therefore reduce
cooperation between workers of different skill levels.12
Kremer and Maskin (1997), Acemoglu (1999) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2003)
argue that there is not only a tendency towards a reduction in cooperation between skilled
and unskilled workers, but at the same time an increase in cooperation between workers
of equal skill level. In our approach, such changes depend on the way in which team work
influences the time requirements for certain activities and of the job in general. For example,
a weekly meeting (τmeet) in which workers discuss their experiences on their performance
of task 2 might save an amount τteam. This is only profitable if
1+ τmeet
h
<
τ1 + τ2
τ1 + τ2 − τteam . (14)
The right-hand side of Eq. (14) increases if task 1 takes less time because of computer use. In
this setting, team working becomes profitable when the work becomes more concentrated on
task 2, which is consistent with Kremer and Maskin’s and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg’s
approaches of diverging production processes among skilled and unskilled workers, and
Acemoglu’s findings of a changing composition of jobs within firms.
4.3. Work intensity
The concentration of work on skilled tasks might not only affect the way in which
workers cooperate, but also the intensity of their work. Computer use is often associated
with work intensification, with the effects of using a computer screen and the increased
amount of information that has to be processed being put forward as explanations (e.g.,
Green and McIntosh, 2001). However, Lantz (1997) shows that workers who spend some
time on a computer to email and to use the Internet suffer less from a higher work in-
tensity. According to our model, the introduction of the computer increases work inten-
sity because it generally increases the time spent on skilled tasks and reduces the time
spent on routine tasks. The relatively more time spent on task 2 offers an explanation for
the fact that work intensity increases and that computerization of the routine part of the
job leads to some offsetting phenomenon captured by sending an email or browsing the
Internet.
5. Conclusion
Computers have brought about a dramatic change at the workplace. Many have focused
on the adoption of computers as a determinant of skill-biased technological change because
12 Note that this reintegration process is more likely to occur if the wage differential between skilled and unskilled
workers is smaller. Further if this integration of routine tasks into a skilled job takes place, this reduces the tendency
to increase the skill requirements within the job.
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computer adoption seems to accompany increased skill upgrading and rising wage inequal-
ity. In this paper, we provide a model to show what happens to the job, skill demand, and
the organization and intensity of work upon the adoption of computer technology at the
workplace by carrying out an experiment using agents T and U.
We show that the cross-section result of a computer wage premium of 15–20 percent
is not the result of the allocation of higher educated workers to the most complex jobs or
some spurious correlations or unobserved skills. Our model reveals that it is more likely
to be profitable for a firm to give a high-wage worker a computer because the efficiency
gain is relatively larger than for a relatively low-wage worker. Neither computer skills nor
complementary skills are necessary to understand why computers are used by high-wage
workers; our argument runs through the cost of adoption. These results are consistent with
studies based on longitudinal and panel data that typically find that computers are introduced
among high-wage workers first, but only lead to very modest wage increases afterwards.
Although agent T adopts the computer, the net wage benefits seem to be modest because
he also has to pay for using the computer. If the time saved or shifted between tasks is too
small or if his wage is too low, adoption will not (yet) occur.
The observation that wages explain the patterns of diffusion and wage differentials be-
tween computer users and non-users does not imply that computers have not led to skill
upgrading. Our model demonstrates that employers seem to upgrade their workforce be-
cause computerization enables firms to use high-skilled workers more effectively as a result
of the diminishing importance of routine tasks. The changing way in which workers can
be employed also leads to a better understanding of changes in work organization and
work intensity, so agent T ’s job will require more effort and skills to be fulfilled and
a reemphasis on skilled tasks as a result of a shift in time in favor of non-routine job
activities.
Finally, one might ask whether the model presented in this paper is specific to the adoption
and diffusion of computer technology or if the diffusion of any general purpose technol-
ogy can be explained by our approach. We think that there are two main reasons why
this model does not hold for the diffusion of general purpose technologies in general,
such as electricity. First, the adoption of computer technology is a decision that can be
taken at the individual level, setting it apart from the adoption of other main technolo-
gies that are by their nature adopted among large groups in society at the same time.
Second, although through market forces computer technology leads to changes in pro-
duction processes and products that are produced, most of the applications of computer
technology can be used to support a worker with the tasks he performed before computeri-
zation. The tasks a worker has to perform within a particular job remain mainly unchanged;
only the time requirements for tasks taken over by the computer are reduced. This may
lead, as we have shown, to a different optimal division of time within the job and in-
duce changes in labor demand, but the job does not disappear. The discriminating feature
of most other general purpose technologies is that they lead to a whole new production
process, making redundant entire jobs or industries, and create new jobs and tasks. Hence,
while most general purpose technologies substitute existing production processes, computer
technology generally supports the worker without essentially changing the tasks (see also
David, 1990 for a comparison of the adoption and diffusion of the dynamo compared to the
computer).
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